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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY USSR (Saratov Oblast)

REPORT

SUBJECT 1. Party Organization and Activity in Saratov Airframe Plant No. 292 (*Plant Manpower*)
 2. Local Government Organization and Activity
 3. Comments on Classified Documents, Beriya's Arrest, Decentralization, and Education

DATE DISTR. 20 February 1959
 NO. PAGES 2
 REFERENCES

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DATE OF INFO.

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

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SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. A report concerning local Party and government organization and activity in the Saratov area, as well as comments on classified documents, decentralization, Beriya's arrest, and Khrushchev's education reform,

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2. The highlights of the report are as follows:

A. Since the beginning of 1955 the increase in Party membership at the Saratov Airframe Plant No. 292 was confined exclusively to manual workers. This development reflected a deliberate policy of increasing the proportion of manual workers in the Party.

B. The leading Party officials in the Saratov Airframe Plant No. 292 were technicians --- the first and second Party secretaries were engineers --- who were pressed into Party careers but who preferred to return to their technical specialties. There was a distinct trend toward filling the leading posts in the Party leadership, at least below the oblast committee level, with technicians skilled in industrial practice rather than in Party administration.

C. Two categories of classified documents were available (1) the documents under the plant administration which concerned production, plans, and operations; and (2) the classified Party documents. The first category was kept in a special office in the plant known as the "first section" (pervyy otdel) and was available only to specially cleared personnel in the plant. Party documents were kept in the office of the Party Committee and those in

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[redacted] concerned Party administrative records, e.g., dues payments, membership lists, future activities. [redacted] had temporary custody of important Party documents, such as Khrushchev's speech on Stalin.

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- D. Among the important classified Party documents [redacted] was an article by Khrushchev published in early 1957 on the problems of industrial organization and administration. This article was apparently a forerunner of Khrushchev's published "theses" on the reorganization of industry.

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- E. [redacted] former Soviet MVD chief, Lavrentiy Beriya, had placed five MVD divisions around Moscow in 1953 in preparation for a coup. Beriya's scheme was disrupted by the head of the Leningrad Military District [A.A. Luchinskiy] who refused to support Beriya and instead informed Marshal Georgiy Zhukov about Beriya's plans. According to this story, Beriya's appeal to the Leningrad commander and the latter's report to Zhukov took place on the same date as the performance at the Bolshoy Theater which was attended by all the Party leaders except Beriya.

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- F. [redacted] one of the reasons behind Khrushchev's educational reform was an oversupply of technical personnel in the USSR. [redacted] the Saratov Airframe Plant No. 292 was beginning to experience difficulties in absorbing new engineers, many of whom had to be assigned jobs as welders or machinists.

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1. The Party Organization in the Saratov Aircraft Factory -
Of the approximately 20,000 workers at the Saratov Aircraft Factory, about 3,000 were Party members and about 3,000 were members of the Komsomol. At any given time there were, in recent years, approximately 100 candidates for Party membership in addition. 25X1
[redacted] in recent years the number of candidates for Party membership had not varied greatly, although there had been an increase in Party membership beginning in 1955. This increase was confined exclusively to manual workers in [redacted] factory 25X1 and represented a deliberate attempt on the part of the Party leadership to increase the percentage of manual workers in the 25X1 Party. [redacted] there were 700 workers in all of which approximately 50 were Party members. The Party Bureau of the 25X1 shop consisted of five members [redacted]
[redacted] Party organization was subordinate to the factory committee of the Party, which was headed by the Party Secretary for 25X1 the factory organization, who was a full-time Party worker. This Secretary's two deputies were also full-time Party workers and their office was assigned a stenographer. These four people were the only full-time Party employees in the factory.

2. Regular Propaganda and Agitation Activities in the Saratov Aircraft Factory - Regular propaganda and agitation

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activities consisted of a brief talk on selected agitation themes 25X1
by the foreman (mayster) of each brigade in the shop at the beginning of the working day. Such talks were called "five-minuters" (pyatiminutki). They usually lasted from 10 to 15 minutes. The subjects for any given day were selected as follows. Each month the Party Bureau for the shop, in coordination with the factory committee, prepared a list of standard topics for agitation to be used in the coming month. Such a list included the anniversaries of significant events in Soviet and world history, Soviet and Communist holidays (such as the October Revolution, International Women's Day and May Day), themes reflecting current internal Soviet policies (such as the reorganization of administration in industry, the increase in agricultural productivity, etc.) and selected international themes (good news and progress from the Communist Bloc, crises and evil plots from the West, successes of national liberation movements in Asia and Africa). The list of such themes, which the Party Bureau prepared, also included references to pertinent sources for the foreman to read before the sessions began. In addition to the themes prescribed on the list, themes of local, factory and shop importance, such as especially good or especially bad production records, etc., were also used. Also, events, particularly world crises affecting the interests of the Soviet Union, were subjects of agitation at the times when concern over these questions was greatest.

The foremen were not required to follow a rigid schedule each month in their agitation themes, although they did have to cover major topics and an appropriate selection of minor ones as well.

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At the end of each month, each foreman submitted

[redacted] a list of the subjects he had covered in the month. This agitation was conducted by the foreman whether they were or were not Party members, although the majority of them were. Party members and particularly the more active Party organizers (Partorgy) played a special role in these agitation sessions too. There were, of course, frequent occasions when [redacted] specifically designated the agitation theme or themes for a given day, as for example during the Suez crisis. There were also occasions on which the factory committee informed [redacted] particular themes to be stressed. But, in general, indoctrination in the conduct of agitation was so intensive, the general themes so emphatically emphasized by the Soviet press and radio, the source material so carefully tailored by those Party and Government organs charged with producing it, that close supervision of the agitational activities on lower levels did not have to be maintained by higher ones. 25X1

Basic source materials used for agitation and propaganda sessions, such as those described above, included the Agitators Companion (Sputnik Agitatora), the lecture pamphlets put out by the All-Union Society for the Distribution of Scientific and Political Knowledge, the newspapers, and the magazines published by the Party.

[redacted] the Agitators' Companion is published for each oblast' by the Party Oblast Committee. It contains a great deal of material for agitation on local themes, such as the development of local industry, the progress of local agriculture, the plans for increasing local housing, etc. It includes, as well, material 25X1

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on which to base other agitation sessions of an all-union or international nature.

In addition to the daily "five-minuters", special meetings are called to reinforce major propaganda and agitation themes when appropriate. Such meetings, for example, were called for the Suez crisis (though not for the Hungarian crisis) and also at the time of the introduction of the Sovnarkhoz system of administration in Soviet industry. Literary and cultural themes, including all those discussions taking place in and around the Saratov Aircraft Factory on the questions of the literature of dissent in 1956 and 1957 were held in the factory club sessions for which attendance was not compulsory [REDACTED]

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3. Organization of Mass Meetings

Mass meeting to stimulate popular enthusiasm for the policies of the Party and the government are held on orders of the factory committee which presumably received them from the Regional Committee of the Party. Meetings of this sort were held to protest the [REDACTED] attack on the Suez and on other similar occasions to protest the actions of "the imperialist camp". Such meetings are also held to indoctrinate the workers on major changes in government policy, for example, on the reorganization of industrial administration into the current Sovnarkhoz system. In the meetings organized on the Suez crisis, [REDACTED] was told by the Factory Committee that there was going to be a mass meeting on the subject and speakers for the meeting should be selected. [REDACTED] a meeting of the members of the bureau of [REDACTED] organization to discuss possible speakers and also checked

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[redacted] with the foremen of the brigades in the shop. [redacted] it is never difficult to get speakers for such occasions because there are always those among the workers who like to get up and talk whether they have any convictions about the subject under discussion or not. [redacted]

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[redacted] Participation in meetings of this sort is also a good way of getting oneself well-known among the members of the party hierarchy and the factory administration as well.

These meetings are usually of approximately 15 minutes in duration and may take place before, during or after the working day. Usually they take place before the working day because the Party can then insure a greater attendance. [redacted] workers may have made arrangements to do other things immediately after work and it was easier to get them to come in a few minutes early to attend a meeting, few of the workers having planned to do anything other than eat breakfast prior to the working day. Whenever a proposal is made at such a meeting that the workers donate a portion of their wages to some worthy cause, as was done in the Suez crisis, this proposal is always made by a non-party worker. One of the secretaries of one of the factory party organizations would arrange this by getting aside one of the non-party workers who enjoyed appearing in such festivities and suggesting to him that he make such a proposal. Such proposals for donations of working time to support a cause of this sort were then immediately seconded by other workers primed for their duties in the meeting and then adopted by a voice vote of all the workers there. [redacted] although the demonstration

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was rigged there was not any real resentment among the mass of the workers against such proposals. This was so because in many cases the donation was returned to the workers rather than being spent for the cause for which it had been designated. The proposal would be that the workers work overtime a half-hour or an hour in addition to the regular working day and donate their overtime pay.

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In that case, in approximately one month after the time had been donated, the extra pay for the overtime hour was returned to the workers. the amount of money collected in a nation-wide campaign of that sort was in fact far in excess of the amount of money that could be sent out of the Soviet Union without placing an undue strain on its foreign currency reserves.

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The same type of overtime work is also performed on occasion by a unit of the factory or perhaps by all the workers of the factory when there is some common goal they wish to achieve. For example, they wanted to buy instruments for an orchestra and were able to buy them all by working overtime.

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the factory management almost invariably welcomes volunteer overtime of this sort because it increases the production record of the factory above the planned norms.

4. Types of People Within the Party Apparatus - The First Secretary of the Party Committee in the Saratov Aircraft Factory was an aviation engineer who had been the deputy to the chief engineer previous to his election to the position of Party Secretary. The Second Secretary was also an engineer who had worked

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for 15 years in the factory. The Third Secretary was an administrator who had previously worked in the special security section and in the personnel section of the factory. [] 25X1

the officials of the party in organizations at this level and below were almost always professional men or workers who took on party assignments for awhile. Many technicians were pressed into a party career on this level rather against their will. Most of them frequently expressed the desire to get back into "real work". They found that they could not keep up with their professions when they were involved in the red tape, the personnel problems and the endless round of meetings which were the daily affair of the Party Secretary. They looked upon service for a time as a party secretary as a strategically good move in their careers, but usually planned to continue within their professions after their term as party secretary was up. [] it is of great 25X1

importance for these secretaries of the organization in a large factory to be experts in the operations of the factory because so many questions in which the Party plays a decisive role are of a more or less technical nature and a person not professionally trained in engineering would not be able to perform the job properly. [] previous to the time when the aviation 25X1

engineer became First Secretary, the First Secretary had been a chemical engineer sent to the factory for the purpose of serving as Party Secretary. This man had not been able to do the job in view of his ignorance of the aviation industry and had been replaced by the aviation engineer. The chemical engineer was then sent as Party Secretary to a chemical factory in some other area.

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[redacted] this man was probably making a career of 25X1

serving in party positions, but added that nevertheless he was 25X1
 a trained chemical engineer. [redacted] most of the
 members of the Central Committee who exerted strong influence
 in the affairs of the Soviet Union were those who had made their 25X1
 careers within the Party almost exclusively. [redacted]

[redacted] at this time it is more and more difficult for a career- 25X1
 ist to rise very high within the Party chain of command unless
 he is also capable, experienced, and well-trained in some other
 field of activity. There is a strong trend at this point to have
 the posts of Party Secretaries, at least below the regional
 committee level, manned by technicians skilled in industrial
 practice rather than in party administration.

5. Regular Meetings and Procedures Within the Party Organ- 25X1
ization - The shop Party Organization met at least once and usually
 twice each month. At least once a month [redacted]

[redacted] had a formal session with the Factory Committee 25X1
 of the Party. At appropriate times, particularly in preparation
 for Party Congresses and elections, there were also mass meetings
 of all the Party members in the factory.

6. Elections to Party Positions - Elections to Party posi-
 tions are held at regular intervals and are preceded by reports
 from the incumbent secretaries on the work of the organization
 during their incumbency. On the level of the Primary Party 25X1
 Organization, [redacted] there was in his experience
 little influence exerted by the higher echelons of the party to 25X1
 control the nomination of candidates. [redacted]

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[] the Party Organization in the Saratov Aircraft Factory was a particularly "liberal" one and secondly, by adding that the criteria for a man elected to a Party position were so well understood by all Party members that the chances of their making an error in nominations was very small. []

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[] those elected had to be approved by the higher echelons after their elections.

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In the Primary Party Organization, a list of seven nominees for the Bureau of the Organization is drawn up in an open meeting of all the members of the Organization. Certain informal discussions preceded this meeting and, although there was no single slate of candidates proposed, certain understandings were reached among influential members of the Organization about whom to nominate. After what was often a very lively discussion, the seven nominees were approved by an open vote. After this the members of the Organization voted by secret ballot for five of the seven. The five receiving the highest number of votes were then designated as the new Bureau of the Organization, provided, of course, that they met with the approval of the Factory Committee. [] open discussion among the members of the organization was positively encouraged by the members of the Factory Party Committee and that no one not generally acceptable to the membership would be elected.

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After the election of the Bureau, its five members meet in private to discuss the assignment of jobs among them. []

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7. The Election For the First Secretary of the Factory Party Organization - All members of the Party attached to the Factory Organization had a general meeting. The Secretary of the Committee read his report of the activities of the Organization during his incumbency and then members of the Organization delivered speeches from the floor either in praise or condemnation of the Organization's activities during that period. [] there was a considerable amount of criticism and self-criticism involved in these meetings. []

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[] the degree to which this was calculatedly inspired by orders from on high and the degree to which it was genuinely spontaneous. [] both types of criticism existed, however. Then nominations were opened for the twenty

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members of the Factory Party Committee. In this election only as many nominees as there were positions on the Committee were proposed in contrast to the seven nominees for five positions in the Primary Organization. [] although the nominating process was obviously arranged from on high, that there was open criticism of some nominees and that occasionally a nominee would be withdrawn and another substituted in his place. [] sometimes these sessions become quite stormy if the Party membership as a whole objects to certain of the nominees. After the question of who was to be nominated had been settled, the twenty nominees were voted for and elected to fill the twenty places on the committee. [] the nominees for the Factory Committee were generally selected by the Regional Party Committee and that, ultimately, the persons selected to serve on the Factory Committee were approved by the Central Committee in Moscow.

When asked to comment on the fate of Party members who took too strong a line in criticizing the incumbents of the Party Committee or the nominees in such a meeting, [] there were usually no consequences for the critic. [] criticism that was too harsh or that seemed to have a deviationist line did usually lead to an investigation. [] one case of a member of the Party who had criticized the Regional Committee as a party placing itself too far above the masses and not being really the representative of the workers. This case [] was investigated and it turned out that

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the critic was a man who had formerly run a cooperative society and had been a manual worker for only a few months himself before making the criticism. This particular person was eventually excluded from the Party and convicted of theft. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the conviction for theft was not a frame-up.

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8. The Division of Duties Between the Secretaries to the Factory Committee Were as Follows:

The First Secretary was in general charge of the Organization, represented it in dealings with higher Party organs and supervised the activities of the Party members among the workers in addition to concerning himself with the over-all problems of the operation of the plant. The Second Secretary acted as the deputy to the First Secretary, without restricting himself to a particular field of activity. The Third Secretary was in charge of all correspondence, maintained the committee's files, including the classified files, and in general over-saw the administration of the Party Organization.

9. Recommendations for Party Membership. - In writing a recommendation for Party membership, the Party member writing the recommendation must have known the person he is recommending personally for at least one year prior to the date of writing the recommendation. That is, a member of the party writing the recommendation must have been in approximately daily contact with the person he is recommending for one year before and upon the day he writes the recommendation. A recommender is supposed to write a recommendation based exclusively on his personal

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knowledge, and is not considered responsible for making a bad 25X1
recommendation in case it turns out that the person he recommended
had something bad on his record beyond the immediate personal
knowledge of the recommender.

The autobiography submitted by ^a Party membership candidate ~~is~~
~~are~~ [redacted] not as a routine matter checked out 25X1
with other Party organizations. Each biography, however, is
scrutinized by the members of the Bureau of the Organization to
which he is applying and by higher authorities within the imm-
ediate area and only in those cases in which there appears to be
something unusual or contradictory in the man's past is an invest-
igation of the man conducted. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] the app-
licant's father had died under circumstances that appear odd; for
instance, if the exact date of death, the cause of death, the
locality of death were not perfectly clear. In such a case invest-
igation might be made to verify that the father was in fact dead
and that he did die in the manner described by the applicant
instead, (as might also be the case) of the applicant's father
being convicted under article 58 of the criminal code or ^{being} other-
wise undesirable ^{as} of the antecedent of a Party member. [redacted]

[redacted] an applicant for Party membership who
lied on his application forms was not punished for that act. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] the deed would be noted in the records of the
Party, and presumably elsewhere.

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10. Elections to Local Soviets. -

A. Selection of Candidates: [redacted] discussed in detail the election campaign in which a woman worker [redacted] was selected as a deputy to the City Soviet. [redacted] by the Factory Committee that a nomination [redacted] would be considered if [redacted] there was somebody appropriately qualified to be a deputy in it. [redacted]

[redacted] informally the members of the Party Bureau [redacted] the members of the Komsomol Bureau [redacted] and the shop steward from the trade union and a couple of [redacted] immediate subordinates. This group of perhaps twelve or fifteen people discussed the prospects and qualification of the potential candidates among the workers [redacted] They finally settled on a young woman worker who had a good production record, had lived in the area for a long time and was consequently well known to many citizens, who seemed to take a lively and enthusiastic interest in local affairs and who was politically and morally above reproach. Having thus agreed on this girl among themselves, they then had a general shop meeting with all the workers to get their candidate formally backed by their Party Organization and by their trade union organization. In the course of this meeting there were tentative nominations of other workers, which were informally turned down, and the result of the meeting was that the girl was unanimously nominated by the shop organizations as a candidate in the election. [redacted]

[redacted] there was a good deal of apathy involved in the whole business and indicating that in its own peculiar way it was really

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democracy at work. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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a good deal of negotiation with the Party Secretaries from other sections of the factory [REDACTED] able to get [REDACTED] nominee backed 25X1
by the factory as a whole. After this the whole matter got settled 25X1
by the Party Secretaries [REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] nominee was officially designated as the candidate. The 25X1
formal meetings in which this was done were all conducted with
open voting by the members of the appropriate Party and trade union
organizations involved [REDACTED] there was 25X1
a good deal of open discussion about the merits of various nominees,
the final vote was considered unanimous. [REDACTED] nominee, having 25X1
become a candidate, was of course unopposed in the election. 25X1

11. The Elections to the Supreme Soviet. - [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Primary Party Organizations 25X1
do back certain nominees in the hope that they will be designated
as candidates by the Party Regional Committee. [REDACTED] 25X1
[REDACTED] the decision to select a candidate for the Supreme Soviet
was certainly not made on a level below that of the Regional 25X1
Committee [REDACTED] what degree the 25X1
Oblast Committee or the Central Committee in Moscow, went in app-
roving candidates selected by the Regional Committee. [REDACTED]

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role in such campaigns was exclusively that of getting out the vote for the candidate selected and of using the election campaign for further general propaganda and agitation purposes.

12. Election Processes and Procedures. - [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The other members of this commission consisted of the Secretary of the Komsomol Organization, the Chairman of the Shop Trade Union Organization, and the head of the shop. The Party Secretary, the Chairman of the Trade Union Organization, and the head of the shop are the three indispensable members on the voting commission, although the Secretary of the Komsomol is almost always also included. [REDACTED] the "triangle" of the head of the shop, the Party Secretary and the Chairman of the Trade Union Organization, as a matter of course always were in charge of all matters of importance related to the shop. The commission sat at a table outside the room in which the voting was to take place and checked the name as given on the passport of each voter against the roster of residents in the election district. Having verified that a given citizen was authorized to vote, they then issued a ballot (byuletin) with the names of the candidate or candidates (depending upon whether elections were being held for more than one office or not) to the voter. The voters then proceeded into another room in which there were three curtained-off booths and beyond them urns in which the completed ballots were to be placed. Beside each urn there was, in addition,

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a table at which a voter could mark his ballot openly. Beside each of the three curtained booths there stood a girl member of the Komsomol who automatically pulled aside the curtain of any empty booth for each incoming voter. [] the majority of the voters used the secret booths rather than placing their ballots directly in the urn or going to the open table to mark them. Voting was accomplished by crossing out the name on the ballot if one intended to vote against the candidate or ^{leaving it} left unmarked if the candidate was approved by the voter. [] there was no pressure on the voters to put their ballots in the urns directly without stopping off in the curtained booths. [] [] while some of the leading Party functionaries and activists do put their ballots directly in the urns, others make a point of going to the booths as a sign that going to the booths was proper for all citizens.

13. The Purposes of Soviet Elections. - [] why the voters were never given a choice between two candidates in any Soviet elections. [] any candidate selected would be very similar in his qualifications, background and attitudes to any other candidate and there was no point in having more than one. [] having two candidates in the elections in the United States was something of a waste of time because the policies applied by members of both major parties in the United States were identical.

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Soviets bothered to have elections at all, [redacted]

[redacted] the elections were useful to the regime as an indication of popular discontent, especially with the First Secretaries of the Regional Party Committees. The First Secretaries of the Regional Party Committees were considered to be the men on the spot, fully responsible for the success of an election campaign as well as all other goings on in their areas. A bad showing in an election campaign was a good sign that all was not going smoothly in the region. 25X1

14. The Election of People's Judges - The selection of candidates for the position of a people's judge (Narodnyy Sud') [redacted]

[redacted] as Party Secretary for the shop organization, was informed [redacted] who the candidate might be and, [redacted] any particular objections to the man, [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] Upon being informed [redacted] who the candidate would be [redacted] the usual procedure in stimulating mass participation for the selection. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] in general high-level positions were designated in the upper echelons of the Party, but that these nominations were cleared with persons [redacted] and the other members of the party bureau [redacted] to insure that there was no information on the candidates of which those making the selection were ignorant. In this manner, the nomination system was used to avoid designating an inappropriate candidate. 25X1

15. Qualifications for Deputies to Local and Other Soviets - 25X1

[redacted] when a local party organization was asked to propose [redacted] 25X1

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nominees for such ^{position}, the type or person; specified by sex, age, type of work, education, etc. ^{was} spelled out to the people who were going to look for a candidate. The object of the exercise was to produce a group of deputies which allegedly represented an appropriate cross-section of society including, for example, a certain number of older manual workers, an appropriate sprinkling of bright young girls and the right number of scientists and intellectuals, etc. ^{the} decision on what type of candidate would be proposed from which party organization was decided by the Regional Committee or members thereof. 25X1

16. Methods of Getting the Vote Out in Soviet Elections. -

During the election, the election committee checked the list of those who had voted against the list of persons resident in the election district to discover who had not voted. As the day ~~went~~ ^{went} on, members of local party organizations, the Komsomol' or members of the election commission checked at the houses in which these people lived to see what had prevented them from voting. Usually when a person was found at home he was willing to come down to the poles and vote. In some cases, the voter was urged to vote and held up to public ridicule as well by having the members of the election commission bring the urn in which the votes were to be placed and a blank ballot to the home of the voter who had not voted. This ostentatious display was usually effective in getting anybody to vote. 25X1

^a citizen who refused to vote would not, however, be punished for not doing it. (Of course it was obligatory for a party member to vote.)

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17. Classified Documents - There were two types of classified documents available [redacted] First, there were the documents 25X1 under the control of the plant administration, pertaining to its production, plans and operations, and secondly, there were the classified Party documents. Concerning the first category, these documents were kept in a special office in the plant known as the first section (Pervyy Otdel'). The varying degrees of classification were indicated both by labels stamped on the documents and 25X1 by serial numbers. [redacted] the three degrees of classification were indicated by serial numbers beginning with one zero, two zeros or three zeros in an ascending order of sensitivity. 25X1 [redacted] the labels stamped on the documents as including secret (sekretno) [redacted] [redacted] the higher classification might have been 25X1 very secret (Sovershenno Sekretno) [redacted] [redacted] the phrase for official use only (dlya sluzhebnogo 25X1 polzovaniya) as one [redacted] only in the armed services. 25X1 The documents kept in the first section were available only to factory employees who had been specially cleared (zasekrechenyy). These cleared employees could go to the section, sign out a document, bring it back to their own places of work, use it during working hours and return it before the end of the working day to the first section. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The documents held in the first section were 25X1 devoted to plant matters and included all the documents on over-all plant production, the procurement of raw materials, production plans and technical data on the products. Party documents were held in the office of the Party Committee in the factory and certain documents were also held in a small safe assigned to the Bureau of the Party Organization [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These included records of dues payments, a list of the members of the organization, plans for future party activities, etc. None of them were of significant importance. 25X1 [REDACTED] important party documents, such as KHRUSHCHEV's speech about STALIN, [REDACTED] had to return these immediately after reading to the office of the Factory Party Committee. [REDACTED] 25X1

[REDACTED] In addition to the KHRUSHCHEV speech, other documents published by the Central Committee of the Party on a classified basis [REDACTED] included an 25X1

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article by KHRUSHCHEV published in early 1957 on the problems of industrial management and organization. This document was apparently a forerunner to KHRUSHCHEV's overt proposal for the reorganization of industry and commented on many of the shortcomings that he cited later in overt speeches. 25X1

18.

the Arrest of BERIYA. -

BERIYA had planned to arrest the other members of the Party Presidium in the weeks leading up to his own arrest. BERIYA had placed five MVD divisions around Moscow in preparation for his coup. BERIYA at the time was staying in his dacha outside of Moscow and was, at the time of his arrest, engaged in making final preparations to take over control of the USSR. He erred, however, in calling the officer in charge of the Leningrad Military District and trying to get support from him for the coup. This officer, instead of supporting BERIYA, however, immediately informed 25X1 ZHUKOV of BERIYA's plans and ZHUKOV was able to place loyal Army divisions between Moscow and the MVD troops that BERIYA had stationed around the city. As soon as this was done an armored force proceeded to BERIYA's dacha, overwhelmed the MVD guards and arrested BERIYA. [REDACTED] BERIYA's appeal to the general in Leningrad and the general's report to ZHUKOV took place during a performance at the Bolshoi Theatre, which was attended by all of the leaders of the Party with the exception of BERIYA. BERIYA had planned to take over shortly after that performance. After

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After BERIYA was arrested there was a wholesale firing of MVD officers. [redacted] Saratov was full of ex-MVD officers looking for jobs in the early Fall of 1953. The MVD still maintains its militarized troops [redacted]

[redacted]

MVD troops are now subordinate, however, to the Commander of the Military District in which they are located, as well as to the MVD, in contrast to the direct and exclusive subordination to the headquarters of the MVD in the BERIYA era.

19. Reaction of the Soviet Population to the Devaluation of Savings Bonds. - The order of the Soviet Government's withholding any further interest payments on Soviet savings bonds and abrogating the right of cashing them in when due for another twenty years was promulgated [redacted]

[redacted] the impact of this order was, of course, disheartening to all holders of bonds. The younger workers, however, did not mind so much as the older ones who had accumulated a considerable sum of money in bonds. The general impact was [redacted]

[redacted] not so great as might have been expected, however, because the average Soviet citizen reckons his total income only in terms of the money [redacted] few, if any, had ever counted on really using the accumulated savings in their bonds. The general attitude toward this savings bond program had been that it was another form of income tax and most people were not overwhelmingly surprised when it turned out to be precisely that. Before the bonds were abrogated, it was possible to sell a

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one-hundred ruble bond for ten or fifteen rubles. This was an illegal transaction, but one in which many people indulged, particularly when they were in need of ready cash. The only legal way to sell bonds was to sell them through the State Savings Banks where they were offered for sale at face value. The demand, of course, for bonds at face value was non-existent. in the Soviet press, prior to the devaluation of the bonds, there had been reports of certain scandals in bond purchase in which individual citizens had managed to buy millions of rubles worth of bonds at approximately a tenth of their face value and so increase the size of their bond holdings that they won the State loteries based on bond serial numbers quite often. In these cases the frequency with which a given person won the loteries attracted the attention of the Ministry of Finance which investigated the case and then discovered the holder was in possession of enormously large sums of bonds. Such a deed was apparently considered a criminal act and the bonds in the possession of a person of this sort were confiscated the individuals themselves were imprisoned.

20. the Reorganization of Administration in Soviet Industry. - the explanation overtly stated in the Soviet press and the subject of so much discussion in the Soviet Union, to wit, that the ministeries represented an overcentralization of control in Moscow and that it

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had proved to be an inefficient and unnecessarily bureaucratic way 25X1
of getting things done. [] in addition to 25X1
this there has been the problem of Party control as well. [] 25X1
[] the Party on the oblast and regional levels particularly, had 25X1
not been able to exert control over major industry and the new 25X1
arrangement made local Party control much more effective. []
[] types of people manning key 25X1
posts in the Party by saying that, as a prelude to the reorganization
of administration in industry and continuing on to the present, there
has been very great pressure on technical men in the Party's ranks
to assume posts of Party responsibility. [] a third obser- 25X1
vation on the reasons for the decentralization program as well. 25X1
[] strategic planning in the
light of the impact of atomic attack might well have had something
to do with it too. [] by dividing the Soviet 25X1
Union up into economic regions, each of which was supposed to be as
self-sufficient as possible within the bounds of economic effec-
iency, that the Soviet Union had initiated a trend toward local
industrial self-sufficiency which would allow industries in regions
unharmed by atomic attack to continue to function even though the 25X1
industry in other regions had been destroyed. []
under the ministerial system all of the factories have one ministry
regardless of their geographical locations supplied each other with
certain materials. This meant that were a factory in Leningrad
to be destroyed, plants in many other cities belonging to the 25X1
same ministry would be unable to function due to lack of material
formerly supplied to them by Leningrad. []

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[] to a significant degree all of the industry in any given region would still be able to function even though the production in other regions had been knocked out due to the emphasis on local self-sufficiency. [] the other side of the problem, which has been so greatly stressed recently in the Soviet press, of excessive local self-sufficiency to the detriment of the over-all plan when this problem was pointed out [] the Soviet leaders had the military strategic situation in mind when they reorganized Soviet industry.

21. Education in the Soviet Union. - []

KHRUSHCHEV's projected reforms in the Soviet educational system and shown the article in Komsomolskaya Pravda of 21 August 1958.

[] to be disturbed by the trend, apparent in the article, in Soviet education to limit the education of most Soviet citizens and to concentrate on the acquisition of manual skills in the education available. [] why this reform is being instituted is as follows. The Soviet Union some years before [] it was beginning to suffer from an excess of technical personnel. [] this problem particularly among the engineering disciplines [] in the Saratov Aircraft Factory. Until 5 or 6 years ago there was a greater demand for engineers than the institutes were able to supply and each engineer upon graduation from the institute had a position of responsibility to look forward to. In recent years, however, the Saratov Aircraft Factory has had considerable difficulty in absorbing new engineers and giving them jobs that measured up to the level of the technical

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education they had received. In recent years new engineers were assigned to ordinary worker's jobs, working as welders or machinists, etc. The engineers didn't like to be assigned to such jobs very much, [] they accepted the situation with reasonably good grace. This was particularly true in view of the fact that an able worker could approach the salary of an engineer if he exerted himself. In some instances it was also possible for the young engineers to earn more as a worker than they might have earned as engineers. [] it was due to this situation that education was now being more rigidly controlled to reduce the number of new graduates in the engineering faculties at least. [] the problems of employment of persons with higher education in disciplines outside of the technical fields. [] a considerable disappointment that the previous plan to give all Soviet citizens a ten year education had been abandoned and thought that this would be a very unwelcome move to almost all Soviet citizens today. Although not prepared to condemn the new move entirely without more information available than that in the article in the newspaper, [] this represented a significant curtailment in the opportunities available to Soviet youth.

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